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Introduction
Financial analysts' research activity seems to be very important for investors in deciding in which companies allocate their wealth. This is mainly due by the fact that gathering all the information necessary for investment decisions involves very high costs for a single unsophisticated investors. Understanding if analysts' reports can influence the market and the degree of reliability of their forecasts has been a theme lively debated in the academic literature but also in the press, mainly because of recent financial scandals. Our database is unique, since it includes all the publicably available reports in the considered period. Following art. 69 of the Consob -12.37% with BHR and CAR respectively. The strategy of an hypothetic investor that, following analysts' recommendations, buy the most recommended stocks and sell the less recommended ones, would yield about the 16.6% (both using the BHR and the CAR methodologies). It is interesting to note the behavior of the portfolio that only includes the stock that receive neutral recommendations. Whereas, theoretically, this portfolio should record an abnormal return close to zero, empirically we find that its performance is -2.27% with BHR and -4.55% with CAR. Investors seem therefore to recognize the potential conflict of interests of financial analysts; in particular when negative recommendations can damage the relationships with the covered company.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second paragraph gives a survey of the literature, the third presents the methodology applied and the database used, the fourth comments the results obtained and concludes.
Survey of the literature
Several empirical studies in the literature have focused on the predicting power of analysts, e.g. Diefenbach (1972) , Bidwell (1977) , Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, Lease (1979) , Copeland and Mayers (1982) , Dimson and Marsh (1984) . Womack (1996) analyzes a sample of 1,573 analysts' recommendation changes, issued between 1989 and 1991, with respect to 822 companies, listed in the US stock market. 4 The analysis uses the information contained in the database of First Call Corporation (now Thomson Financial), a company that records in real time all reports issued by analysts. The empirical evidence shows that the stocks subject to a recommendation change records an abnormal return significantly different from zero: positive (+ 2.4%) in case of upgrade, negative (-9.1%) in case of downgrade.
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The asymmetry between the two values can be explained with the greater frequency with which analysts tend to issue upgrades and with the greater cost of issuing a negative report. Several cases are known both in the academic literature and in the financial press of analysts that have been excluded from informative meeting or that have not received relevant information from the management of a company on which they issued a negative recommendation.
Thus, an analyst face a trade-off between the need of issuing reports that are reliable, 4 Womack's work is subsequent to the study of Stickel (1995) that is based on a sample of 17,000 changes of recommendations issued by brokerage analysts between 1988 and 1991. 5 The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on a three days window centered on the event day and adjusted for the size of the companies considered is 3% for buy recommendations and -4.7% for sell recommendations.
to defend her reputation, and the necessity to maintain good relationships with the management of the covered companies. 6 The empirical results clearly show that stocks prices and volumes are influenced by recommendation changes. The author highlights that analysts are particularly good in stock picking but also in market timing, however they mostly issue positive reports and focus on companies with higher capitalization. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001) assess the effective profitability of portfolio's strategies based on the average consensus of analysts' recommendations. Whereas Womack's perspective is "analyst-oriented and event-time" (e.g. to measure average price reaction to changes in analysts' recommendations), the perspective of Barber et alii. is "investor-oriented and calendar-time". In other terms, while the first study investigates the analysts and time is measured with the classical event study methodology, the second one focuses on investors and the analysis is performed in real calendar time. This approach permits the authors to directly measure the abnormal gross returns to a number of investment strategies and to estimate portfolio turnover and the associated transactions costs incurred in implementing them. The data used in the paper come from the Zacks database for the period 1985 to 1996, which includes over 360,000 recommendations from 269 brokerage houses and 4,340 analysts. For the sample period, Barber et alii. find that buying the stocks with the most favorable consensus recommendations earns an annualized geometric mean return of 18.8%, whereas buying those with the least favorable consensus recommendations earns only 5.78%. After controlling for market risk, size, book-to-market, and price momentum effects, a portfolio that includes the most highly recommended stocks provides an average annual abnormal gross return of 4.13% while a portfolio of the least favorably recommended ones yields an average annual abnormal gross return of 24.91%. Thus, purchasing the securities in the top portfolio and selling short those in the lowest portfolio yields an average abnormal gross return of 75 basis points per month.
In a subsequent research Barber et al. (2003) extend the sample period including [2000] [2001] , highlight that the more highly recommended stocks earned greater marketadjusted returns during the 1996-1999 period than did the less highly favored stocks. See, the cases reported in Belcredi, Bozzi and Rigamonti (2003) . was a result of analysts' reluctance to turn away from small-cap growth stocks during this period, a time when such stocks significantly underperformed the market.
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The tecnique of consensus-based portfolios is also used by Boni and Womack (2003) wich examine the competition between analysts. To add value to the recommendations, analysts specialize in the study of few stocks. The period considered is from 1996 to 2001. This work highlights that the returns achievable through strategies based on their reports and on changes of recommendations, record a Sharpe ratio that is five times greater than the one associated with a "price momentum" strategy. In particular, a strategy consisting in buying stocks that have been upgraded and selling stocks that have been downgraded is able to generate a monthly return of 1.4%, about the 18% per year. After a month from the change of recommendation, the returns from the stocks recommended by analysts are positive for 53 firms out of 59. Analysts' competition reduces the opportunity to profit from changes of recommendation: portfolios formed with stocks followed by a great number of analysts generates lower returns.
These results are also coherent with the broad definition of market efficiency given by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , since positive returns are necessary to compensate for the costs needed to collect information. It seems, thus, that analysts' recommendations have investment value to investors. Using the theoretical framework proposed by See also the recent research of Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, Lee (2004) . According to these authors' framewok the level of the analysts' consensus does not contain incremental information when it is issued in correspondence with other predictive signals. It is the change in the analysts' consensus, rather than the level, to be informative. There can be different explanation of this difference. The reports online, for instance, can be only a part of the reports available at Borsa Italiana. 10 An alternative explanation is that intermediaries send all the reports to Consob, but only a part to Borsa Italiana. Of course, this behavior would result in contrast with the Consob Regulation on Issuers. It would be desirable to solve this "dilemma", and we believe that Consob, as the authority supervising the Italian Stock Exchange should verify this anomaly and make available the results of this inquiry.
The investment values of analysts recommendations

Descriptive analysis of the sample
11
Starting from the whole sample, we have cleaned it eliminating reports that were not useful for our analysis, i.e. eliminating double reports, non monographic, without any recommendation or where it was ambiguous. The final sample includes by 12,791 reports issued by 68 financial intermediaries on 235 listed companies. In Appendix, we propose the main descriptive statistics of the sample of reports with recommendation, that constitutes the starting point of subsequent analysis. Comparing the number of reports received by each company with its size, it is evident that analysts focus on bigger companies. From figure 1, it is clear that the companies belonging to the first quartile of capitalization received more than 57% of the reports, compared to a 7% of the last quartile. Emanuela Conti (R&D Office Borsa Italiana -Borsa Italiana Group), however, assured that it seems that only few studies (about 150) are available only in paper version.
To the best of our knowledge there is no such clarification available.
We find support to the empirical evidence presented in the literature 12 that financial analysts focus their attention on stocks with higher market capitalization. A possible explanation is that analysts work more on big companies since they are characterized by higher volumes of transactions on which the financial intermediary for which they work can earn higher trading and brokering commissions. See Womack (1996) on the American market. For Italy, see Fabrizio (2000) and Cervellati, Della Bina (2004) . 6,000
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Furthermore, we highlight that only few intermediaries cover most of the companies, while the remaining prefer to focus just on few listed companies. Comparing the number of report issued by financial intermediaries with the number of companies, it is clear that the subjects that are more active in issuing reports are also the ones that cover the greatest number of companies (see table 3 ). This highlight the importance of checking for potential conflict of interests of intermediaries that have a relevant position in the research sector. 
The recommendations issued by financial analysts
Analysts use a variety of systems in their recommendations: five, six or three points scale, or even numeric systems. For this reason it is difficult to compare ratings issued by different analysts. Since, furthermore, really few intermediaries report the rating systems they use, it is necessary to pay attention to compare recommendations that seem to be similar, but that are issued by analysts for different financial intermediaries that use different rating system. In other words, the same recommendation could mean different things in different rating systems. To compare different rating systems it is opportune to use an homogeneous scale.
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We decided to use both a three-points and a five-points scale, to uniform our analysis to the prevailing international literature in this field. The first scale represents the simplest type of rating system since it divides the recommendations in positive, neutral and negative, using the ratings buy, hold and sell. The second scale, the most used in the literature and by analysts is instead a five-points scale: buy, add, hold, reduce and sell. This rating system permits a wider range of ratings adding a moderate positive rating (add) and a moderate negative judgment (reduce). that, in the whole period considered, 7,112 reports (55.6% of the total) report a positive recommendation, while only 1,230 (9.62% of the total) a negative one. This evidence is well known and debated in the literature. Usually researchers have advanced two main explanations: analysts' excessive optimism or conflict of interests.
The first hypothesis refers to the fact that analysts seem to be too optimistic on the perspectives of the stocks they follow. The second one argues that analysts prefer not issuing any report instead of issuing a negative one.
Classifying the recommendations based on the current and previous rating it is possible to form a matrix of the changes of recommendations, highlighting the frequency of upgrades and downgrades. As it is possible to see from tables 6 and 7, the greatest part of the reports does not contain changes of recommendation: in the five-points scale the unchanged reports are the 84.06%, while in the three-points scale are the 86.94%. Not every report contains the previous rating, since some of them are initiation of coverage and others are preceded by reports in which there is no recommendation.
Considering this fact, the sample size reduces to 11,008 reports for which we also have the previous rating. Observing the matrices of the changes of recomendations, it is possibile to note that the greatest part of unchanged positions is referred to, in a five-points system ( Considering the five-points scale, the upgrades are the 7.73%, while the downgrades are the 8.21%. With reference to the three-points scale, the upgrades are only the 6.24%, while the downgrades are the 6.82%. In this category we consider monographic studies for which it does exist a previous rating, but that have not been included in the matrices of changes of recommendation since, for example, the valuation of the stock has been temporarily suspended or since the analyst that initially covered the stock is changed. This result seems in contrast with the previous studies in the literature, but it is possibile to explain it considering the fact that the greatest part of the period considered refers to bear markets. It is, furthermore, coherent with the hypothesis of overoptimism of the analysts. 
Methodology
In this paragraph we describe the methodology used to determine the value of an investment strategy based on the average consensus of analysts' recommendations. As a first step, we have calculated, for each period and company, the average consensus.
As time period of reference we have chosen the quarter. The reason is twofold: on a practical ground, to have enough recommendations in each portfolio in every period, we could not use a monthly basis as it has been used in other studies in the literature; 18 from a theoretical point of view we argue that the quarter constitutes for many portfolio managers the right period for performance evaluation and portfolio rebalancing, more often if the investment is managed through banks or mutual funds.
To determine the average consensus on a company, in a given quarter, it has been necessary to attribute a numeric value to each rating.
The scale that we have used is the following: Buy = 1; Add = 2; Hold = 3; Reduce = 4; Sell = 5. The average consensus per quarter for a company is calculated as the sum of all the ratings issued by analysts on that company in the quarter, and diving by the number of reports in the same period. where:
A , is the average consensus on company "i" in quarter "t";
is the individual ratings contained in each of the ni,t reports issued in the quarter on the considered stock; ni,t is the number of reports issued on stock i in quarter t.
The average consensus thus calculated, however, does not allow to have an idea of the degree of agreement or disagreement among analysts that have issued ratings on the considered company. We have, therefore, decided to introduce a simple measure of dispersion of the recommendations around the average consensus.
As a measure of dispersion we have used the standard deviation: Once classified the companies following the average consensus in each quarter, it is possible to form portfolios based on this consensus.
Five portfolios have been formed, for each quarter: portfolio 1: companies with the highest ratings, i.e. those with average consensus in between 1 and 1.5 portfolio 2: companies with positive ratings, i.e. those with average consensus in between 1,5 and 2,5 portfolio 3: companies with an intermediate consensus, i.e. those with consensus between 2,5 and 3,5 portfolio 4: companies with a slight negative consensus, i.e. those with consensus between 3,5 and 4,5 portfolio 5: companies with a very negative consensus, i.e. those with consensus between 4,5 and 5
To evaluate the performances for every quarter of these portfolios we have used two where: CARi,s is the cumulate abnormal return of company "i" in quarter "s"; Ri,t is the return of company "i" in day "t"; E(Ri,t) is the expected return of company "i" in day 19 See Barber, Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber,Tsai (1999) .
"t". The difference Ri,t -E(Ri,t) represents, therefore, the abnormal return of company "i" in day "t". Once obtained the CAR for every company, we have computer CARs for the portfolios as an average of the CARs of the companies in each portfolio for every quarter. where: CARp,s is the abnormal return of portfolio "p" in quarter "s"; n is the number of stocks forming the portfolio p.
A limitation of the CAR methodology, however, is that it assumes that one should periodically adjust the portfolio to equally distribute the wealth invested in the portfolio among different stocks. Using the BHR methodology, the return in each quarter of a stock is expressed as:
where: BHRi,s is the excess return of stock "i" in quarter "s"; Ri,t is the return of stock "i" in day "t"; E(Ri,t) is the expected return of stock "i" in day "t". where: BHRp,s is the excess return of portfolio "p" in quarter "s"; n is the number of stocks in portfolio p. Following Barber and Lyon (1997) we consider as an estimate of the expected return E(Ri,t) the return of a market index Rm,t.
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Both methodologies can therefore be re-expressed with the following formulas: The underlying assumption here is that the total amount invested in each portfolio is equally divided among all the stocks. are the standard deviations of abnormal returns for the "n" stocks forming portfolio "i".
The investment value of analysts' recommendations
In this paragraph we examine the investment value of a strategy based on the average consensus of analysts' recommendations. For each portfolio and every quarter, we have determined the average consensus of ratings issued on each stock from analysts that have outstanding recommendations on that stock in the considered quarter.We have also calculated excess returns, adjusted by the market returns, using CAR and BHR methodologies. If analysts recommendations have value, ordering the portfolios from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the portfolio containing the best ratings and 5 the portfolio containing the worst ones, we would expect to observe the following effects:
 portfolio 1 should have the most positive adjusted excess return;  portfolio 2 should have a positive excess return, but lower than portfolio 1;  portfolio 3 should have adjusted excess returns close to zero;
22
Using the continuously compounded return one assumes that Pt = Pt-1e Rt , where Rt is the rate of return during the period (t -1, t).
23
See Barber and Lyon (1997) .
 portfolio 4 should have a negative adjusted excess return;  portfolio 5 should have the most negative adjusted excess return. Table 11 shows the total return in each quarter for every portfolio. The returns are all statistically significant and reflect the expectations, confirming our hypothesis. The "Average Dispersion", reported in second column of table 11, measures the degree of agreement between analysts within each class of rating. By construction, it represents the standard deviation, adding additional information with respect to the mere average consensus in the class. It would be possible to have the same average consensus, but a different dispersion and, therefore, a rather different degree of agreement. With reference to table 11, take for example portfolio 1, that presents a low average dispersion, equal to 0.21. However, it should be considered that the range of the class is only 0.5, from 1 to 1.5, therefore the incidence of the average dispersion is 42%.
Portfolio 2 is the one in which single ratings are more dispersed, 70%, followed by portfolios 3 and 4 with, respectively, 52% and 39%. Portfolio 5 has no dispersion. Table 11 contains other interesting results. Considering the number of reports in each portfolio, it is evident that the portfolios that have the greater number of reports are those containing non-negative ratings.
This result can be addressed using different explanation. The first one supports the hypothesis of an "optimistic bias" of analysts that tend to view the stocks that they follow too favorably.
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The second hypothesis claims that analysts are reluctant to issue negative ratings, to avoid problems with the management of the covered companies. A third explanation can be that analysts simply follow, on average, stocks 24 This explanation is proposed by the behavioral approach to finance, that relate psicology and finance.
with better performances. Portfolio 1 has recorded an average return of 6.92%, with reference to all the quarters considered, using BHR and 4.24% with CAR. Portfolio 5, instead, had a performance of -9.7% with BHR and -12.37% with CAR.
Adopting a portfolio strategy based on the consensus of financial analysts, i.e. buying the stocks with the more favorable recommendations and selling the least recommended ones, an investor could gain an abnormal retur of about 16.6%, both with BHR and CAR, as highlighted in table 12 that contains the differences between quarterly average returns. It seems, therefore, that analysts' recommendations have real investment value for investors. However, the present analysis does not take into account transaction costs. It is necessary to take into account the commissions, as well as the bid-ask spread and the other costs related to transactions to calculate the net return for investors.
The paper by Barber et al (2001) shows, in fact, that taking into account these costs, the abnormal returns recorded following analysts' recommendations tend to disappear.
Von Nandeslstadh ( returns, once that it takes into account transaction costs. It is interesting, however, to highlight that investors can obtain positive abnormal returns if they follow only the recommendations of analysts that do not work for a bank.
The results for portfolios 2 and 4 seem to be in line with expectations as well.
The former has recorded an average return of 2.01% with BHR and 0.55% with CAR, 25 while the latter has realized -5.29% with BHR and -8.56% with CAR. The results for Portfolio 3 are instead somehow surprising, or at least of difficult interpretation. This portfolio should theoretically have an excess return close to zero, while for our sample it recorded a -2.27% with BHR and a -4.55% with CAR. A possible explanation of these negative returns can be advanced referring to the incentives that analysts have to issue a neutral rating, instead of a negative one. Several studies in the literature, but also articles in the financial press, have shown that analysts can face several problems after issuing a negative recommendation. There have been cases in which analysts have been excluded from meetings with the managers of a company or from receiving relevant information after having issued a negative recommendation. Analysts therefore face a trade-off between issuing correct ratings, to build their own reputation, and maintain good relationships with the management of the companies they follow to have access to the necessary information they need for their research activity. It seems that this trade-off pushes analyst to be upward biased, i.e. the tendency to issue neutral ratings while instead they should issue negative ones, or even not to issue negative reports at all.
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In table 13 we provide the differences between annual returns on the five portfolios, for BHRs and CARs, referred to the whole period considered. The differences in terms of annual returns among portfolios are of relevance and statistically significant, in particular the difference between "extremes" (portfolio 1 and 5) is large (16.61% with BHR and 16.60% with CAR) and significant at the 1% confidence level. It is worth to notice that only the differences between portfolios 3 and 4 for BHR and between portfolios 4 and 5 for CAR are not statistically significant, probably due to the fact, already discussed in the paper and in literature, that hold and reduce ratings can be considered as negative recommendations, not significantly different from sell ratings.
25
This value (0.55%), however, it is not statistically significant.
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The bias induced by omitting to issue negative reports is well illustrated by Fabrizio (2001) .
Tab. 12. Differences between average quarterly returns for each portfolio (t-Stat in brackets)
Parte To test the hypothesis that neutral ratings can be associated with negative judgments by the analysts, we furthermore divide the stocks in two portfolios, respectively formed by companies with non-negative consensus (1 |--| 3), including the hold ratings as nonnegative, and the ones with negative average consensus (3 --| 5). Observing table 13, it is possible to note that the first portfolio, with an average dispersion of the ratings equal to 0.45, has recorded a positive average excess return of 2.10% with BHR and 0.13% with CAR, 27 while the second portfolio has realized, with an average dispersion of ratings of 0.57, a negative excess return .
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This value (CAR= 0.13%), however, is not statistically significant. In this alternative definition, the first portfolio records an adjusted return of 3.37%
with BHR and 1.42% with CAR, with an average dispersion of ratings of 0.54; whereas the second portfolio realizes a performance of -3.48% with BHR and -6% with CAR, with an average dispersion of 0.29. We should highlight that the positive returns associated with the "Positive" ratings portfolio are higher than before.
At the same time the returns of the "Non Positive" portfolio are better than before, since now we have added the neutral recommendations to this second portfolio and eliminated from the first one. First of all, we should note that the number of reports in the second portfolio increases, with benefits in terms of robustness of the results. In fact, whereas in the first classification (non negative "vs" negative) the CAR was not statistically significant, in this alternative definition, not only is significantly different from zero, but it is also higher in magnitude. Furthermore, while the average dispersion in the positive portfolio almost remains the same, the one associated with the second portfolio dramatically decreases, 28 suggesting an higher degree of agreement between non positive ratings, once neutral and negative recommendations are pooled together.
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It slightly increases in absolute terms for the positive portfolio, but since the range of ratings narrows, in relative terms it decreases. For the non positive portfolio the decrease is even bigger if we consider the wider range of ratings that are now included in the non positive portfolio. From a comparison between the number of reports received from each company and its size, we have shown that analysts prefer to issue reports on bigger companies. An explanation of this phenomenon is that since bigger companies are characterized by an higher number of transactions, they could allow for some economic benefits deriving from the commissions on trading and brokering activity.
Few intermediaries produce the majority of reports and the more active in issuing studies are also the ones covering the majority of firms. This evidence highlights the importance of controlling for potential conflict of interests of intermediaries that have a relevant position in the market of reports.
Considering the distribution of recommendations issued by analysts, we have also shown that the percentage of positive ratings is always greater that the fraction of negative ones. This evidence can be explained in two alternative ways: analysts can show excessive optimism in their reporting activity, or they can just omit to issue a negative report to avoid problems with the management of the companies, that is the main source of the information they use.
Apart from this preliminary and descriptive analysis of the sample, to verify if analysts' reports have any investment value, we have formed five portfolios, dividing stocks on the base of the average consensus for each quarter of the sample. We used the CAR and BHR methodologies to calculate average abnormal returns of the five portfolios for each quarter and for the period as a whole. Comparing excess returns of each portfolio in the entire period of time that we have considered with the level of average consensus of analysts' rating, we found results in line with our intuition.
Portfolio formed by very or moderately positive ratings record a positive excess return, while portfolios with very or moderately negative ratings have shown negative excess returns. The portfolio containing neutral ratings gives instead ambiguous results. From a theoretical point of view it should record excess returns close to zero. The results, instead, show negative excessive returns both with the CAR and BHR methodologies.
An explanation, well-accepted in literature, is that neutral ratings can be considered as negative ones, since in general analysts tend to issue very few reduce or sell ratings.
After having performed the proper tests for statistically significance, we find that analysts recommendations have indeed investment value if we consider an horizon that is at least annual, or that take into consideration the whole sample.
The results shown thus far have not considered transaction costs. We should include these costs in the analysis to see if analysts recommendations really convey investment value or if they, even if positive, would not be sufficient to cover those costs. Future research will have to consider this aspect. More generally, however, we can conclude that seems that investors can rely on analysts' average consensus, with a caution, to consider very carefully neutral recommendations that, as shown in the literature, can be considered as negative ones. The reporting activity seems therefore to significantly influence the investment decisions of investors, and under this light it can be seen the increasing amount of regulation of the Italian and European legislators. The main objective of these regulations on reporting activity is in fact to favor the diffusion of transparent and timely relevant and price sensitive information to help investors in their decisions.
In this regard, we argue that legislators should impose more precise criteria on the more delicate aspect contained in the recommendations, i.e. the neutral rating.
If one objective of regulation is to enhance transparency and disclosure, then it is necessary that investors really understand the meaning of every recommendation. On this respect, it seems appropriate to quote Irving Fisher: "Risk is inversely proportional to knowledge".
